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Fidelity Metrics for Virtual
Environment Simulations Based
on Spatial Memory Awareness
States
Abstract
This paper describes a methodology based on human judgments of memory aware-
ness states for assessing the simulation fidelity of a virtual environment (VE) in rela-
tion to its real scene counterpart. To demonstrate the distinction between task
performance-based approaches and additional human evaluation of cognitive aware-
ness states, a photorealistic VE was created. Resulting scenes displayed on a head-
mounted display (HMD) with or without head tracking and desktop monitor were
then compared to the real-world task situation they represented, investigating spa-
tial memory after exposure. Participants described how they completed their spatial
recollections by selecting one of four choices of awareness states after retrieval in
an initial test and a retention test a week after exposure to the environment. These
reflected the level of visual mental imagery involved during retrieval, the familiarity
of the recollection and also included guesses, even if informed. Experimental results
revealed variations in the distribution of participants’ awareness states across condi-
tions while, in certain cases, task performance failed to reveal any. Experimental
conditions that incorporated head tracking were not associated with visually in-
duced recollections. Generally, simulation of task performance does not necessarily
lead to simulation of the awareness states involved when completing a memory
task. The general premise of this research focuses on how tasks are achieved,
rather than only on what is achieved. The extent to which judgments of human
memory recall, memory awareness states, and presence in the physical and VE are
similar provides a fidelity metric of the simulation in question.
1. Introduction
The mapping from the real-world environment to the computer graphics
environment is mediated by environmental or visual fidelity (Waller, Hunt, &
Knapp, 1998). The term visual fidelity refers to the degree to which visual fea-
tures in the virtual environment (VE) conform to visual features in the real
environment. Interface or interaction fidelity refers to the degree to which the
simulator technology (visual and motor) is perceived by a trainee to duplicate
the operational equipment and the actual task situation. It is argued that train-
ing, for instance, in a VE with maximum fidelity would result in transfer equiv-
alent to real-world training because the two environments would be indistin-
guishable (Waller et al., 1998). Robust metrics are essential to assess the
fidelity of VE implementations comprising computer graphics imagery, display
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technologies, and 3D interaction metaphors across a
range of application fields. Apart from optimization of
technological characteristics such as resolution, field of
view (FOV), and latency, one common belief is that
efficient task performance measures should serve as fi-
delity metrics for any application that mainly targets
transfer of training in the real world (Bailey & Witmer,
1994; Waller et al., 1998; Lathrop & Kaiser, 2002). A
commonly employed strategy, therefore, for assessing
the simulation fidelity of a VE is to compare task perfor-
mance in a VE to task performance in the real-world
scene represented in the VE. Another common ap-
proach is to employ a cross-application construct, such
as the sense of “presence” to assess the effectiveness of a
VE or aspects of a VE according to its success in en-
hancing presence. There is a widespread belief that pres-
ence should somehow improve task performance, al-
though this has yet to be verified or indeed reasons
offered as to why this should be the case (Stanney et al.,
1998).
This paper argues that, because of the wide range of
VE applications and differences in participants across
their background, ability, and method of processing
information, an understanding of how tasks are under-
taken within a VE complementing what is achieved, is
significant. This rationale is applied here to spatial mem-
ory recall. The utility of VEs, regardless of the applica-
tions they are proposed for is predicated upon the accu-
racy of the spatial representation formed in the VE. The
framework to be presented has been drawn from tradi-
tional memory research adjusted to form an experimen-
tal procedure to compare real scenes and their computer
graphics simulated counterparts. Here, participants
could describe how they achieved their spatial recollec-
tions after exposure to an environment by selecting one
of four awareness states (“remember,” “know,” “famil-
iar,” or “guess”) (Tulving, 1985, 1993; Conway,
Gardiner, Perfect, Anderson, & Cohen, 1997; Gardiner,
2000). These judgments reflect the level of visual men-
tal imagery involved at retrieval and the familiarity of
the recollection including guesses, even if informed. To
demonstrate the varied distribution of cognitive activity
even when task performance remains the same, a photo-
realistic VE was created displayed on a head-mounted
display (HMD)—incorporating either mono or stereo
rendering with or without head tracking—and desktop
display. Resulting scenes were then compared to the
real-world task situation they represented, employing
memory recall of elements of the space as well as report
of awareness states on an initial test and a retention test
a week after the initial exposure. Central to this work is
identifying whether experimental conditions such as the
real-world one and those incorporating head tracking
(thus including proprioceptive information) are associ-
ated with stronger visually induced recollections (“re-
member” awareness state) compared to conditions asso-
ciated with a typical mouse interaction interface. This
work also aims to explore whether a cognitive shift be-
tween initial test and retest is going to signify a perfor-
mance shift. This study extends a preliminary study by
Mania and Chalmers (2001).
2 Background
2.1 Spatial Training in Synthetic
Worlds
The first effort to compare real and simulated
computer graphics static scenes side by side was at-
tempted by Meyer, Rushmeier, Cohen, and Greenberg
(1986). Radiometric values predicted using a radiosity
rendering of a basic scene were compared to physical
measurements of radiant flux densities in the real scene,
both of which were viewed through the back of a view
camera. In a more recent approach, McNamara, Chalm-
ers, Troscianko, and Gilchrist (2000) described a
method for measuring the perceptual equivalence be-
tween a real scene and static computer simulations of
the same scene based on human judgments of lightness.
Results showed that rendering solutions such as tone
mapping were of the same perceptual quality as a photo-
graph of the real scene.
For real-time VE applications, a central research issue
for training could be how participants mentally repre-
sent an interactive computer graphics world and how
their recognition and memory of such worlds corre-
spond to actual conditions. Waller et al. (1998), Bailey
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and Witmer (1994), and Bliss, Tidwell, and Guest
(1997) examined the variables that communicate trans-
fer of spatial knowledge and discuss the form and devel-
opment of spatial representation in VE training in rela-
tion to either real-world training or training with maps,
photographs, and blueprints. The suitability of VE sys-
tems as effective training mediums is examined and con-
cluded to be as effective as map or blueprint training
(Waller et al., 1998; Bliss et al., 1997) with configura-
tional knowledge acquisition similar to training with
photographs and real-world training (Bailey & Witmer,
1994). Dinh, Walker and Hodges (1999) investigated
the effects of tactile, olfactory, audio, and visual sensory
cues on participants’ memory recall of a building. Two
levels of visual detail were investigated by reducing tex-
ture resolution with or without ambient auditory, olfac-
tory, and tactile stimulation. No significant main effect
was revealed on spatial layout recall. Accurate recall of
objects’ locations was significantly higher when tactile
and olfactory cues were incorporated in their environ-
ment. Arthur, Hancock, and Chrysler (1997) examined
participants’ ability to reproduce a complex spatial lay-
out of objects having experienced them previously un-
der different viewing conditions (a free binocular virtual
condition, a free binocular real-world condition, and in
a single-viewpoint monocular view of the real world).
Mapping results showed a significant effect of viewing
condition where, interestingly, the static monocular
condition was superior to both the active virtual and
real binocular conditions.
Experimental postexposure methodologies for spatial
recall investigation range from questionnaires (Dinh et
al., 1999) to drawing sketches of a space after exposure
(Billinghurst & Weghorst, 1995) or applying the spatial
knowledge acquired so as to navigate effectively the real-
world space represented (Waller, et al., 1998; Bailey &
Witmer, 1994; Bliss et al., 1997). Performance accuracy
is the dominant means of assessing a VE simulation. In
this paper, performance accuracy is complemented by
self-report of awareness states during retrieval, utilizing
a memory task and a retention memory test a week after
exposure across real-world and photorealistic VE view-
ing conditions.
2.2 Memory Awareness States
Methodology
Memory, in the sense of “information” for subse-
quent analysis, plays an important role in perceptual
systems such as the visual, auditory, haptic, and kines-
thetic. Memory is not a unitary system (Baddeley,
1997): in the process of acquiring a new knowledge
domain, visual or nonvisual, information retained is
open to a number of different states. Some elements of
a learning experience or of a visual space may be “re-
membered” linked to a specific recollection event and
mental image or could just popout, thus, could be just
“known.” According to Tulving (1985), recollective
experiences are the hallmark of the episodic memory
system. Knowing refers to those in which there is no
awareness of reliving any particular events or experi-
ences, a mental thesaurus (semantic memory). Tulving
introduced a distinction between remember and know
responses and provided the first demonstration that
these responses can be made in a memory test, item by
item out of a set of memory recall questions, to report
awareness states as well. He reported illustrative experi-
ments in which participants were instructed to report
their states of awareness at the time they recalled or rec-
ognized words they had previously encountered in a
study list. If they remembered what they experienced at
the time they encountered the word, they made a “re-
member” response. If they were aware they had en-
countered the word in the study list but did not remem-
ber anything they experienced at that time, they
expressed a “know” response. The results indicated that
participants could quite easily distinguish between expe-
riences of remembering and knowing.
There is some preliminary evidence that the distinc-
tion between remembering and knowing reflects a dif-
ference in brain activity at the time of encoding (Smith,
1992). It is assumed that recognition memory can be
based largely on knowing, with little or no remember-
ing. All that is necessary for encoding into the semantic
system is some initial awareness of events. In contrast,
encoding into episodic memory must depend on greater
conscious elaboration of the events. Gregg and
Gardiner (1994) showed that estimates of the strength
298 PRESENCE: VOLUME 12, NUMBER 3
of the memory trace are greater when derived from re-
member plus know responses than when derived from
only remember responses. Knowing, thus, reflects an
additional source of memory, not merely a difference in
response criteria. Although, remember and know aware-
ness states have been controversially linked to episodic
and semantic memory types with know responses more
theoretically problematic, recent research emphasized
that “they can be used without commitment to any the-
ory, but simply to provide information on how various
phenomena, including memory disorders, are character-
ised experientially” (p. 933) (Gardiner, 2000). In a rele-
vant study, overall recognition performance in two
groups of participants was very similar; however, the
reported states of awareness differed markedly. One can-
not make assumptions on what participants experience
mentally from only their performance; therefore, there is
no alternative to the use of subjective reports. Thus,
additional information of awareness states provides an
invaluable input into how participants complete recol-
lections. Subsequent research to Tulving (1985), sum-
marized in Gardiner (2000), demonstrated that some
variables affect one or the other of the two states of
awareness, that some variables have opposing effects on
them, and that some variables have parallel effects on
them. This finding indicates that the two states of
awareness are functionally independent.
Conway et al. (1997) argued that familiarity can be
defined as the feeling that something has been encoun-
tered or experienced recently, although nothing about
this recent occurrence can be remembered. Know re-
sponses, on the other hand, represent highly familiar
memory items that may come to mind without recol-
lecting any particular encounter or any feeling of a re-
cent encounter and cannot be placed. Conway et al.
showed that these finer-grained judgments could be
dissociated from each other, just as different source
memory judgments can. A confidence scale cannot com-
municate awareness states. It is also suggested that,
when a new knowledge domain is to be acquired, mem-
ory is represented initially in an episodic way. As time
goes by, the underlying representations may change
such that they do not represent recollective experiences
and are simply known, leading to a semantic representa-
tion and schematized conceptual knowledge. There is
little evidence that feelings of familiarity reflect the se-
mantic memory system that supports highly familiar
long term knowledge. Gardiner (2000) concludes: “psy-
chology of memory should take on board subjective
reports of conscious states and not just rely on more
conventional measures of performance. This evidence
has established that the essential subjectivity of remem-
bering and knowing does not make reports of these
states of awareness intractable to science” (p. 940).
3 Experimental Methodology
3.1 Experimental Design
Five groups of 21 participants were recruited from
the University of Bristol undergraduate and M.Sc. stu-
dent population, and they received course credits for
their participation. Eighty percent of the participants
from each group were men, and all used computers a
great deal in their daily activities. A between-subject
design was utilized, balancing groups for age and gen-
der. Participants in all conditions were informed that
they could withdraw from participation at any time dur-
ing the experiments and they were naive as to the pur-
pose of the experiment. Participants had either normal
or corrected-to-normal vision (self-report). According
to the group they were assigned to, participants com-
pleted the same memory task in one of the following
conditions.
1) In reality, wearing custom-made goggles to re-
strict their FoV, allowing for monocular vision;
referred to as the real-world condition.
2) Using a photorealistic computer graphics simula-
tion on a monocular head-tracked HMD; referred
to as the HMD mono head-tracked condition.
3) Using the same application on a stereo head-
tracked HMD; referred to as the HMD stereo
head-tracked condition.
4) Using the same application on a monocular HMD
with a mouse interface; referred to as the HMD
mono mouse condition.
5) Using the same application displayed on a typical
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desktop monitor with a mouse interface, wearing
the same restrictive goggles as in the real-world
condition; referred to as the desktop condition.
A week after their experience, all participants were
retested on the same memory task.
3.1.1 The Real Environment. The real environ-
ment consisted of a 4  4 m room (Figure 1). Each
wall of this room had a different landmark: one wall
consisted of a door and shelves, one wall a door and a
greenboard, the third wall a whiteboard, and the fourth
smaller shelves on both its ends. The existing window in
the room was firmly covered with black lining to keep
natural light out. The light fixtures in the room were
replaced with a standard incandescent bulb (assumed
diffuse, light emission in all directions). Several tables
were placed close to the walls, and 21 primitive objects
of approximately the same size (seven boxes, seven
spheres, and seven pyramids) were scattered around the
room, on the tables and shelves. All the objects were
painted one shade of blue using the same diffuse paint.
A swivel chair was placed in the middle of the room.
3.1.2 The Computer Graphics Simulation.
There was tight control over the visual appearance of
the experimental space across real-world and simulated
conditions. The geometry in the real room was mea-
sured using a regular tape measure with accuracy of the
order of 1 cm. A photometry instrument (Minolta Spot
Chromameter CS-100) was used to measure the chro-
maticity CIE(x,y) and luminance (Y) values of the light
and materials in the real room. The Minolta chromame-
ter is a compact, tristimulus colorimeter for noncontact
measurements of light sources or reflective surfaces. Lu-
minance relates to the quality of a color that most re-
sembles the human’s notion of brightness. Bright colors
are generally of a high luminance and dark colors are
generally of a low luminance. The illuminant (light
source) was measured by placing a white sheet of paper
in a specific position. Most of the materials (walls, ob-
jects, shelves, floor, plugframes) were measured at the
same position. To ensure accuracy, five measurements
were recorded for each material, the highest and lowest
luminance magnitudes were discarded, and an average
was calculated of the remaining three triplets. However,
as this was a room in daily use, some variations existed
in all of the surfaces due to texture, age, and dirt.
The CIE (1931) color space is based on color match-
ing functions derived by human experimentation, and it
incorporates the trichromacy of the Human Visual Sys-
tem (HVS). The usefulness of the CIE(x,y) representa-
tion is that it allows color specification in one language;
however, equal geometric steps of CIE(x,y) space do
not correspond to equal perceptual steps. Before speci-
fying display colors, it is necessary to compute the tri-
stimulus matrix of the display in question. To compute
the RGB tristimulus matrix, the chromaticity coordi-
Figure 1. The real-world room (real-world condition).
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nates of the three display phosphors in CIE(x,y) space
are required. In addition, the chromaticity coordinates
of the white that the three phosphors of the display pro-
duce when turned on at their maximum are also re-
quired (Travis, 1991). Generally, the RGB system is a
means for describing colors on a display monitor. It
does not take into account the energy that is produced
in the physical world in terms of the distribution over
wavelength and also how HVS responds to this distribu-
tion.
For the final measurements, the illuminant had to be
taken into account. Measuring a diffuse surface under a
given light source results in Yxy values, which include
the contribution of the light source itself. Incandescent
bulbs are quite orange, and fluorescent light is quite
green; however, the HVS perceives light in relative val-
ues and not as absolute measurements such as the ones
out of the chromameter. For example, if 1000 is the
luminance in the real world, 100 the luminance of a
real-world material, but 100 the luminance in the com-
puter graphics simulation, then the luminance for the
simulated material needs to be 10 for the same ratio to
be preserved. The color constancy attribute of the HVS,
generally, is responsible for humans perceiving a white
sheet of paper as white under a wide range of illumina-
tion. If a participant is immersed into a synthetic space
on a display, theoretically, this should be true as well,
but the small size of the displays prevents color con-
stancy from occurring. In relevant calculations for simu-
lating real-world illumination in a synthetic world,
therefore, color constancy needs to be enforced in the
rendering process because the HVS does not function as
in the real world due to the nature of the displays. The
color of the illuminant in RGB values was set as (1,1,1)
for the radiosity rendering white.
To render the scene, the materials’ diffuse color needs
to be specified, not the color observed under a particu-
lar light source. The final color for each measured mate-
rial in the scene is estimated by dividing its RGB value
by the RGB value of the observed white in the scene,
which is the color of the light source in the scene. Using
the relevant geometry and surfaces and illuminant mea-
surements converted to RGB triplets as input, the ren-
dered model was created using a radiosity rendering
system (Figure 2). The final radiosity solution consisted
of a finely meshed model that could be interactively ma-
nipulated. This was the basis for the application dis-
played on the desktop monitor and on the HMD. The
desktop monitor and the HMD were gamma corrected
using the Minolta Spot Chromameter CS-100 to ac-
quire relevant luminance readings. When accurate co-
lour specification is required as is often the case in scien-
tific applications, the non-linear relationship between
display luminance and voltage is a significant source of
error and needs to be corrected to linearity.
3.2 Materials
The five groups of participants were asked to com-
plete the same set of questionnaires. This set included
the SSQ questionnaire (Kennedy, Lane, Berbaum, &
Lilienthal, 1993) before and after the task, the memory
task and memory awareness states questionnaire, and
the presence questionnaire (Slater, Steed, McCarthy, &
Maringelli, 1998). All participants across the five condi-
tions completed the same memory task a week after the
initial experiment reporting on memory recall, confi-
dence, and awareness states.
3.2.1 Memory Recall Task. The memory recall
questionnaire was designed to test the participants’
Figure 2. The radiosity rendering.
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memory recall of the positions and geometric shape of
the 21 objects in the room. A diagram for each wall in
the room included numbered positions of objects in
various locations. The diagrams were administered to-
gether with the task questionnaire, which consisted of
21 multiple-choice questions representing the 21 ob-
jects in the scene (Figure 3). Every question included
three possible answers (box, sphere, or pyramid) and a
confidence scale with five possible states: no confidence,
low confidence, moderate confidence, confident, cer-
tain. Every question also included an awareness states
report for every recollection, based on the memory
awareness methodology offering four choices: remem-
ber, know, familiar, or guess. The participants were re-
quired to report on the shape of the object in each
numbered position on the diagram, starting with the
positions they were more confident that they remem-
bered. The design, thus, of the task questionnaire did
not force participants to start from a specified position
in the room offering the capability to report, initially,
their most confident recollections. A pilot study was
conducted to determine the number of objects and,
therefore, the number of questions of recall in relation
to the exposure time so as to avoid possible floor or ceil-
ing effects (the task being too easy or too hard). Prior
to filling out the core of the task questionnaire, partici-
pants were given instructions designed to explain what
the memory awareness states depicted, as follows.
● REMEMBER means that you can visualize clearly
the object in the room in your head, in that particu-
lar location. You virtually “see” again elements of
the room in your mind.
● KNOW means that you just “know” the correct
Figure 3. Diagrams utilized for memory recall testing, for each wall of the room. (Included here in high
and low resolution)
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answer and the alternative you have selected just
“stood out” from the choices available. In this case
you can’t visualize the specific image or information
in your mind.
● FAMILIAR means that you did not remember a
specific instance, nor do you know the answer. It
may seem or feel more familiar than any of the
other alternatives.
● GUESS means that you may not have remembered,
known, or felt that the choice you selected had
been familiar. You may have made a guess, possibly
an informed guess, e.g., you have selected the one
that looks least unlikely.
3.2.2 Other Measures. The presence question-
naire developed by Slater et al. (1998) was designed to
measure the level of presence on a Likert seven-point
scale and was administered after the initial memory re-
call task across conditions. The widely used Simulator
Sickness Questionnaire (SSQ) was administered before
and following participants’ exposure across conditions
(Kennedy et al., 1993).
3.3 Procedures
3.3.1 The Real-World Condition. The SSQ
was administered before exposure. Following this proce-
dure, participants were asked to wear any glasses or con-
tact lenses they normally use when they have to focus at
2 m distance (self-report). Subsequently, their dominant
eye was identified by a widely used sighting test. A pre-
determined viewing position was set by manipulating
the height of the swivel chair according to the individ-
ual. Appropriate goggles were worn that restricted par-
ticipants’ FOV to 30 deg. to match the desktop and
HMD’s FOV allowing for monocular vision through
the dominant eye only (Figure 4). The FOV was re-
stricted in the real-world condition to match the FOV
of the displays. Although this action resulted in a “win-
dow” to the real world through the goggles, it was con-
sidered necessary to keep the FOV constant across con-
ditions. Participants were instructed that they would be
guided to a room where they would spend 3 min. ob-
serving by rotating the swivel chair they would sit on
placed in the middle of the room; however, they were
not aware of the postexposure task. Navigational pat-
terns and idle time were monitored and recorded during
exposure through a digital compass attached on the
swivel chair (Mania & Randell, 2002). After the set ex-
posure time of 3 min., participants were guided to the
test room where the questionnaire pack was adminis-
tered together with the appropriate instructions.
3.3.2 The Display Conditions. The computer
graphics application was displayed on a Kaiser Pro-View
Figure 4. The real-world and HMD mono/stereo condition (head-
tracked).
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30, gamma-corrected HMD (Figure 4). The viewpoint
was set in the middle of the room and navigation was
restricted to a 360° circle around that viewpoint and
180° vertically to simulate participants’ movement on
the swivel chair in the real room (three degrees of free-
dom). The geometric FOV was calculated to be the
same as the visual angle, through the goggles, in the
real room. For the HMD monocular conditions (head-
tracked and non-head-tracked), the dominant eye was
identified and the appropriate screen of the HMD was
covered, allowing for vision through only the dominant
eye. For the HMD stereo head-tracked condition, each
participant’s interpupilary distance (IPD) was measured,
and the stereo application’s parallax was set accordingly
for the individual. For the desktop condition utilizing a
gamma-corrected, typical 21 in. desktop monitor, each
participant’s dominant eye was identified, and the ap-
propriate goggles were subsequently worn as in the real-
world condition. The frame of the monitor was covered
with black cardboard to achieve a foreground occlusion
effect, resulting in a stronger sense of depth. Horizontal
rotation was monitored across all conditions (Mania &
Randell, 2002). There was no other source of light be-
sides the HMD or desktop display during exposure. The
frame rate was retained at fourteen frames per second
across all conditions. Although this is not a particularly
high frame rate, it was considered adequate. The display
resolution was 640  480 (HMD maximum resolution)
across technological conditions and the FOV was con-
stant (30°) across all conditions, including the real-
world condition with restrictive goggles fitted. The
computer graphics rendering was computed taking into
account real-world photometric measurements resulting
in a photorealistic rendering as described in the previous
section. Texture mapping was applied only on the doors
and tables in the room.
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 Memory Awareness States’
Statistical Analysis
Awareness state data were represented as prior and
posterior probabilities. Koriat and Goldsmith (1994)
have drawn an important distinction between the
amount or quantity remembered compared to the accu-
racy or quality of what is remembered. In the quantity
analysis memory awareness states, data are represented
as a priori or prior probabilities. Although this notation
does not follow the Bayesian probability theory princi-
ples for prior probabilities, it is going to be adopted as
such in this paper following the characterizations of Ko-
riat and Goldsmith (1994) as well as Conway et al.
(1997). Prior probabilities are obtained by calculating
the proportions of correct answers falling in each of the
four memory awareness categories for each participant.
In the accuracy analysis, correct recall scores are repre-
sented as posteriori or posterior probabilities. To calcu-
late posterior probabilities, the proportion of correct
answers from the total of answers given in each memory
awareness category is computed for each participant.
For participant n,
Xin is the number of correct answers for the i awareness
state,
Xin is the number of incorrect answers for the i aware-
ness state,
i  {remember, know, familiar, guess}  {1,2,3,4}
then,










P in is the posterior probability for awareness state i re-
lated to participant n,
P in 
Xin
Xin  X in
. (2)
Generally, prior probabilities pose the following ques-
tion: given that the response of a participant is correct,
what is the probability that the participant has chosen a
particular state on that question? Posterior probabilities,
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on the other hand, ask: given that a response of a partic-
ipant was assigned to one of the four memory awareness
response categories, what is the probability that the re-
sponse is correct? For the purpose of this study each
memory recall question included a five-point confidence
scale and a choice between remember, know, familiar,
and guess awareness states. The goal of this strategy was
to identify the distributions of awareness states re-
sponses across conditions focusing on visually induced
recollections. This could reveal variations that wouldn’t
be possible by just counting right and wrong answers.
4.2 Spatial Memory Recall and Memory
Awareness States Results
The participants completed the memory task
including confidence and awareness responses across
the five conditions. The memory recall scores for the
initial task and retest, the confidence scores as well as
the prior and posterior probabilities derived from the
memory awareness states data set were analyzed using
ANOVA, a powerful set of procedures used for test-
ing significance when two or more conditions are
used. Significance decisions involve rejecting or re-
taining the null hypothesis (which claims that groups
are identical). The null hypothesis is rejected when
the probability that a result occurring under it is less
than .05 (Coolican, 1999).
The total number of objects that were correctly lo-
cated and identified was counted for each participant
after completing the initial test as well as the retention
test a week after. The memory performance measures
were subjected to a 5 (viewing condition)  2 (testing
session) mixed ANOVA with viewing condition as a
between-subjects factor and testing session as a within-
subjects factor, with number of correct responses as the
dependent variable. Table 1 shows the mean accurate
recall scores and standard deviations (in parenthesis) as a
function of viewing condition and test/retest session.
All effects were evaluated at a p level of .05 to determine
statistical significance. There was a significant main ef-
fect for testing session (F(1,100)  36.51, p  .01) but
not for viewing condition (F(4,100)  1.47, p  .05).
The interaction between testing session and viewing
condition was not significant. These results show that
participants had retained significantly less spatial infor-
mation over time; however, the viewing condition had
no effect on the decrease of recall performance.
A confidence measure was included for each recollec-
tion. The confidence scores were subjected to a 5 (view-
ing condition)  2 (testing session) mixed ANOVA
with viewing condition as a between-subjects factor and
testing session as a within-subjects factor, with the con-
fidence selection (no confidence  1, low confidence 
2, moderate confidence  3, confident  4, certain 
5) as the dependent variable. Table 1 shows the mean
confidence scores and standard deviations (in parenthe-
sis) as a function of viewing condition and test/retest
session. There was a significant main effect for testing
session (F(1,100)  183.59, p  .01), but not for view-
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations for Accurate Memory Recall Performance and Confidence Scores as a Function of




Initial test Retest Initial test Retest
Real world 12.42 (4.29) 10.14 (4.60) 3.22 (0.78) 2.50 (0.77)
HMD mono head-tracked 12.25 (5.05) 10.75 (4.41) 2.93 (0.85) 2.05 (0.86)
HMD stereo head-tracked 10.89 (3.63) 9.42 (3.80) 2.66 (0.63) 1.94 (0.83)
Desktop 10.90 (3.94) 8.00 (3.53) 2.94 (0.55) 2.27 (0.64)
HMD mono mouse 10.56 (3.21) 8.34 (3.21) 2.99 (0.60) 2.15 (0.73)
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ing condition. Also, the interaction between testing ses-
sion and viewing condition was not significant. These
results show that participants had significantly less confi-
dence over time while completing the memory task;
however, the viewing condition had no effect on the
decrease of confidence. Table 2 shows the mean prior
probabilities and standard deviations (in parenthesis) as
a function of viewing condition and test/retest session.
Prior probabilities indicate the proportion of correct
answers under each memory awareness state. The prior
probabilities were subjected to a 5 (viewing condi-
tion)  4 (awareness state)  2 (testing session) mixed
ANOVA with viewing condition as a between-subjects
factor and both awareness session and testing session as
within-subjects factors. There was a significant main
effect for awareness state (F(3,300)  11.17, p  .05)
but not for viewing condition. The interaction between
awareness state and viewing condition was significant
(F(12,300)  1.8, p  .05). The interaction between
awareness state and testing session was also significant
(F(3,300)  42.4, p  .05). One-way ANOVA and
Tukey’s post-hoc tests were applied following the signif-
icant interaction between awareness state and viewing
condition separately for the initial task and retest. There
was a significant main effect of condition upon the re-
member awareness state, F(4,104)  3.016, p  .05,
and a tendency of significance for the know awareness
state, F(4,104)  1.913, p  .1. In particular, the prob-
ability that correct responses would be linked with the
remember awareness state was significantly higher for
the HMD mono mouse condition compared to the
HMD mono head-tracked and HMD stereo head-
tracked conditions (p  .05). No significant effects were
revealed for the retest. The three-way interaction be-
tween viewing condition, awareness state, and testing
session was not significant. A thorough inspection of the
prior probabilities means reveals that correct remember
responses dramatically declined over time and correct
guess responses substantially increased over time. A pos-
sible interpretation could be that correct remember re-
sponses were converted to correct guess responses at the
retest, with correct know and familiar responses com-
paratively slightly changed.
Table 3 shows the mean posterior probabilities and
standard deviations as a function of viewing condition
and test/retest session. Posterior probabilities represent
the probability that a memory recall response assigned
to each of the memory awareness states is accurate. Pos-
terior probabilities related to the familiar and guess
awareness states were calculated for the retest. A small
number of participants selected the remember and know
awareness states resulting in posterior probabilities not
being calculated reliably. The posterior probabilities
were subjected to a 5 (viewing condition)  4 (aware-





















Real world 0.33 (0.25) 0.16 (0.25) 0.26 (0.25) 0.15 (0.24) 0.27 (0.24) 0.33 (0.28) 0.12 (0.16) 0.34 (0.29)
HMD mono
head-tracked 0.27 (0.30) 0.04 (0.09) 0.25 (0.29) 0.13 (0.24) 0.24 (0.21) 0.29 (0.20) 0.22 (0.20) 0.53 (0.29)
HMD stereo
head-tracked 0.24 (0.23) 0.10 (0.19) 0.16 (0.19) 0.07 (0.16) 0.39 (0.3) 0.37 (0.26) 0.18 (0.18) 0.44 (0.29)
Desktop 0.29 (0.24) 0.04 (0.09) 0.20 (0.18) 0.13 (0.24) 0.28 (0.2) 0.29 (0.2) 0.2 (0.18) 0.53 (0.29)
HMD mono
mouse 0.49 (0.22) 0.09 (0.15) 0.10 (0.14) 0.20 (0.27) 0.22 (0.18) 0.27 (0.22) 0.17 (0.17) 0.41 (0.34)
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ness state) mixed ANOVA with viewing condition as a
between-subjects factor and awareness session as a
within-subjects factor, separately for test and retest. For
the initial task, there was a significant main effect for
awareness state (F(3,150)  19.70, p  .05) but not for
viewing condition (F(4,50)  1.20, p  .05). The in-
teraction between viewing condition and awareness
state was not significant. For the retest, there was a sig-
nificant main effect for awareness state (F(1,89)  9.47,
p  .05) and for viewing condition (F(4,89)  2.62,
p  .05). The interaction between viewing condition
and awareness state was not significant. A subset of par-
ticipants was included in this analysis due to the issues
just mentioned.
Correlation analysis between the prior probabilities
derived from the awareness states results and confidence
scores revealed a varied pattern of significant correla-
tions (Pearson’s):
● There was a significant positive correlation between
correct “remember” responses and confidence
scores for the desktop (r  0.45, p  0.05), and
HMD mono mouse (r  0.65, p  0.001) condi-
tions.
● There was a significant positive correlation between
correct “know” responses and confidence scores for
the real (r  0.75, p  0.001), the HMD mono
head-tracked (r  0.42, p  0.05), and the desktop
(r  0.64, p  0.001) conditions.
● There was a significant negative correlation between
correct “familiar” responses and confidence scores
for the real (r  0.58, p  0.01), desktop
(r  0.57, p  0.01), and HMD mono mouse
(r  0.59, p  0.01) conditions.
● There was a significant negative correlation between
correct “guess” response and confidence scores for
the real (r  0.57, p  0.01), HMD mono head-
tracked (r  0.78, p  0.001), HMD stereo
head-tracked (r  0.61, p  0.01), and desktop
(r  0.63, p  0.01) conditions.
Crucially, correct “remember” responses, which were
significantly higher for the HMD mono mouse condi-
tion compared to the HMD head-tracked conditions,
also positively correlated with confidence scores while,
respectively, they did not for the HMD head-tracked
conditions.
Generally, incorporating awareness states in a mem-
ory test connects memory recall with cognitive activity
and forms a framework that investigates how humans
























Real world 0.90 (0.31) — 0.62 (0.37) — 0.47 (0.30) 0.44 (0.30) 0.60 (0.33) 0.41 (0.23)
HMD mono
head-
tracked 0.85 (0.25) — 0.73 (0.33) — 0.49 (0.34) 0.49 (0.27) 0.46 (0.26) 0.47 (0.10)
HMD stereo
head-
tracked 0.77 (0.31) — 0.49 (0.35) — 0.49 (0.33) 0.55 (0.19) 0.27 (0.31) 0.33 (0.21)
Desktop 0.65 (0.43) — 0.68 (0.33) — 0.43 (0.31) 0.46 (0.26) 0.43 (0.32) 0.32 (0.22)
HMD mono
mouse 0.88 (0.19) — 0.53 (0.37) — 0.38 (0.32) 0.35 (0.28) 0.28 (0.26) 0.27 (0.21)
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mentally represent a space from a cognitive point of
view rather than a task performance point of view. Such
metrics could form an integral part of the significant
performance efficiency measures.
4.3 Presence and Simulator Sickness
Results
The presence questionnaire was administered after
the initial task was completed. A binomial regression
analysis was employed based on the count of high scores
out of six presence questions and following the analysis
discussed in the Slater et al. study. A value of 0 was as-
signed if the count of high scores was 0–2, and 1 if the
count of high scores was 3–6. Binomial regression, gen-
erally, shows the probability of falling under one of the
0 or 1 binomial distributions. An overall effect of condi-
tion was not revealed. Similar effects of condition on
presence were revealed in studies in which the validity of
the questionnaire is examined (Usoh, Catena, Arman, &
Slater, 2000). The questionnaire may have failed to pick
up the difference across conditions or there was not any
due, for instance, to the high quality of the rendering. A
concrete understanding of presence, in a way that will
allow formal assessments of its perceived level in experi-
mental studies such as this one (if this is ever possible or
desirable), will aid towards forming relevant conclu-
sions. The SSQ scores (Kennedy et al., 1993) were low
due to the short exposure time.
5 Discussion
This investigation focuses on the effect of different
viewing conditions (direct perception of objects in a
real-world setting versus perception of the computer
graphics representation of this setting) on observers’
attributions regarding object-location memory. Accu-
racy of performance per se is an imperfect reflection of
the subjective experience that underlies performance in
memory tasks. Accurate memory task performance can
be accompanied by either a recollection of prior specific
experience (remembering) or reliance on a general sense
of knowing with little or no recollection of the source of
this sense (knowing), including familiarity and guesses
even if informed. Training in a VE system capable of
perfectly simulating the real world should result in the
same training effect as that in the real world. The partic-
ipants who mentally visualized the room and the objects
in the room during retrieval had a higher proportion of
correct responses under the remember awareness state.
The participants that employed mnemonic strategies
based on words instead of visually retaining elements of
the space reported the know awareness state, which re-
sulted in a proportion of correct responses linked with
the know awareness state. If a weaker trend of nonvisu-
ally induced recollections is employed by participants
towards stronger visually induced recollections linked to
the remember awareness state, it could be assumed that
their mental representation of a space involved more
“vivid” recollections.
There was a significant main effect of condition upon
the remember awareness state. It was anticipated that
the amount of correct remember responses would be
higher in conditions incorporating more naturalistic
interfaces such as head tracking. However, results re-
vealed that the proportion of correct responses linked
with the remember awareness state was significantly
higher for the HMD mono mouse condition compared
to the HMD mono head-tracked and HMD stereo
head-tracked conditions (initial task). Crucially, these
responses correlated positively with confidence scores.
Therefore, an interface of high-simulation fidelity such
as head tracking does not always correspond to visually
induced memory awareness states. A similar result was
revealed in a preliminary study by Mania and Chalmers
(2001). If specific applications require a high amount of
recollections based on visual mental imagery, a “natu-
ral” interface such as head tracking may not be appro-
priate. Therefore, desirable variations of awareness states
for specific application purposes could be identified. It
could be true, for instance, that for flight simulation
applications it is crucial for trainees to achieve a high
level of visually induced recollections related to instru-
ments as opposed to feelings of familiarity of even confi-
dent recollections that are not accompanied by visual
imagery. If “reality” is associated to the degree of simi-
larity to the real-world task situation, then, in this case,
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the HMD mono mouse condition is not very “real.”
The awareness states distribution is affected by the de-
gree of realism of the motor response. Word-based
mnemonics and, generally, recollections that were not
linked to visually induced recollections were identifiable
by the high proportion of correct know responses. The
utilization of a viewing method such as the HMD to-
gether with an “unreal” motor response such as the
mouse, appeared to have prevented participants employ-
ing nonvisually induced recollections and resulted in a
larger distribution of correct responses assigned to the
remember awareness state. By decreasing the degree of
“reality” of the motor response, participants paradoxi-
cally adopted visually induced recollections. Achieving
high fidelity could incorporate the need for similar
awareness states between a real-world task situation and
its computer graphics simulation. Here, something less
“real,” therefore, less computationally expensive but
more demanding because of its novelty, may restore a
more naturalistic or desirable awareness state. Research
could identify such issues by using methodologies that
allow investigations based on awareness states responses.
Additionally, a significant shift of correct remember re-
sponses in the initial task to correct guess responses in
the retest was observed. This shift was observed across
all conditions, and it did signify a lower number of cor-
rect recollections between initial test and retest.
The task employed in this study did not allow for free
navigation around the experimental space. The FOV
was restricted in the real-world setting to match the
FOV of the displays for methodological reasons. Future
work could include a task that would allow freedom of
navigation and also a testing strategy that would incor-
porate transfer of training in the real world. Matching
participants’ performance in simulations to performance
in a real-world situation does not guarantee that the
cognitive activity linked with performance will be similar
across the simulated conditions. Task performance
scores could, therefore, be taken into account according
to specific awareness states. By employing methodolo-
gies, such as the memory awareness states methodology,
computer graphics and VE technology research could
exploit human perceptual mechanisms towards success-
ful applications.
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